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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This appeal presents several questions that appear to be issues of first
impression in Idaho. Ms. Neal was convicted, following a conditional plea of guilty, of
one count of possession of a controlled substance under Idaho Code§ 37-2732(c).
Ms. Neal was charged with possession of methadone because she gave birth to

a child whose umbilical cord blood tested positive for methadone. Ms. Neal asserts that
probable cause did not exist for the court to find that she "possessed" a controlled
substance where the only evidence of the substance was a positive blood test, and that
the presence of a controlled substance in the umbilical cord blood of her newborn baby
does not establish probable cause for a charge of possession of a controlled substance
against her.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On March 27, 2011, Ms. Neal gave birth to a baby girl, B.N. (Preliminary Hearing
Exhibit 2, p.118.) 1 Immediately after she was born, B.N. appeared
of narcotic withdrawal.

to be exhibiting signs

(Preliminary Hearing Exhibit 2, p.123.)

Ms. Neal was

questioned, and provided information regarding her prescription for a painkiller
containing the opiates hydrocodone and oxycodone, to treat a pilonidal cyst. 2
(Preliminary Hearing Exhibit 2, p.121.) However, B.N.'s cord blood also tested positive

1

All references to "Preliminary Hearing Exhibit 2" refer to the bates numbers stamped at
the bottom of each page of the exhibit, and not the PDF pages of the electronic copy of
the exhibits.
2
The prescriptions for these medications were lawfully obtained. (11/17/11 Tr., p.7,
Ls.10-12.)
1

for methadone, 3 a drug which Ms. Neal admitted that she was never prescribed.
(Preliminary Hearing Exhibit

p.123.) Notably, both Ms. Neal and B.N. tested negative

for methadone; only B.N.'s cord blood had a positive test result for methadone.
(Presentence Investigation, p.3.) Ms. Neal maintained that she did not know how the
methadone came to be in the cord blood, as she did not knowingly ingest any
methadone during her pregnancy. (11/17/11 Tr., p.6, L.13 - p.7, L.9.)
On August 11, 2011, almost six months after the birth of B.N., the State charged
Ms. Neal with felony possession of a controlled substance, methadone, in violation of
l.C. § 37-2732(c), based upon the lab results which found methadone in the umbilical
cord blood of B.N. (R., pp.5-6, 25-26.)

A preliminary hearing was held, and the

committing magistrate judge bound Ms. Neal over to answer to the charge in district
court.

(R., pp.23-24.)

The magistrate judge found probable cause to believe that

"Ms. Neal possessed a controlled substance and that she is the individual who
possessed it,"

based on the testimony of the detective who spoke to Ms. Neal at the

hospital and the medical records of Ms. Neal and B.N. (11/17/11 Tr., p.14, Ls.12-18.)
Counsel for Ms. Neal filed a Motion to Dismiss Information and Brief in Support of
Motion to Dismiss. (R., pp.38-50.) Ms. Neal argued that an individual cannot be
convicted of possession of a controlled substance based solely on the results of a blood
test which identified a controlled substance in the defendant's baby's cord blood for
which she did not have a valid prescription. (R., pp.41-42.) At the hearing on her
Motion to Dismiss, Ms. Neal asked the district court to adopt the majority rule in other
states that the mere presence, without additional corroborating evidence, of a controlled

3

Ms. Neal acknowledges that the blood test was positive for methadone for purposes of
this appeal only.

2

substance in a person's body does not constitute possession within the meaning of the
criminal possession of controlled substance statutes. (11/17/11 Tr., p.1, L.13 - p.17,
L.19; R., pp.42-50.) The State countered that it did produce evidence of possession
other than a positive drug test; that evidence being that Ms. Neal admitted that she did
not have, nor had she previously received a valid prescription for, methadone. 4
(State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, R., pp.55-57.)
After hearing the arguments of counsel, the district court denied Ms. Neal's
motion to dismiss. (R., pp.62-69; Tr. 3/14112.)

The district court examined the out-of-

state cases cited by Ms. Neal, which hold that evidence of a controlled substance in
one's body, standing alone, is not sufficient to sustain a conviction, but found that
"Ms. Neai did not cite any authority that supports the contention that a positive blood or
urine test, by itself, is insufficient to support probable cause."

(R., p.67.)

Ms. Neal

entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of felony possession of a controlled
substance, preserving her right to challenge the district court's denial of her motion to
dismiss on appeal; in exchange, the State agreed to limit its recommendation to an
underlying sentence of seven years unified, with two years fixed, and to recommend
probation.

(R., pp.71-72; Tr. 4/19/12, p.39, L.9-p.40, L.1.) The district court accepted

Ms. Neal's Alforc/5 plea and ordered a substance abuse evaluation and a Presentence
Investigation (hereinafter, PSI). (Tr. 4/19/12, p.53, L.25 - p.55, L.8.) The district court
imposed a withheld judgment, and placed Ms. Neal on probation for a period of five

4

The State's argument missed the mark, as the issue set forth by Ms. Neal in her Brief
in Support of Motion to Dismiss was whether Ms. Neal "possessed" methadone within
the meaning of the statute, not whether methadone was lawfully obtained. Ms. Neal
conceded that she did not have a valid prescription for methadone and had not been
~rescribed methadone.
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

3

(R., pp.73-81, 62-69; Tr. 6/14/1
of Appeal.

p.15, Ls.11-16.) Ms. Neal filed a timely Notice

(R., pp.84-86.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying Ms. Neal's motion to dismiss?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Neal's Motion To Dismiss The State's
Information Due To A Lack Of Probable Cause To Support The Offense Charged

A.

Introduction
Ms. Neal asserts that the erred in denying her motion to dismiss the State's

information based upon the failure of the State to establish probable cause for every
element of the charged offense. Specifically, the State failed to establish that Ms. Neal
had both knowledge of the methadone and exercised dominion and control over the
methadone found in her newborn's umbilical cord blood.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing a finding of probable cause, this Court defers to the findings of
fact of the lower court that are supported by substantial evidence, but this Court reviews
de nova whether those facts as found constitute probable cause.

State v. Martinez-

Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 778 (Ct. App. 2012).

In addition, this Court reviews the application and construction of statutes de
nova. State v. Ephraim, 152 Idaho 176, 177 (Ct. App. 2011). In doing so, this Court is

obligated to give effect to every word and phrase within the statute, to avoid a
construction that would render any portion of the statute a nullity, and to further avoid
treating any of the terms within the statute as mere surplusage. See, e.g., Bradbury v.
Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 116 (2009); Ephraim, 152 Idaho at 177; State v.
Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505 (Ct. App. 2003).

6

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Neal's Motion To Dismiss The
State's Information Due To A Lack Of Probable Cause
There was insufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause for the

offense of possession of a controlled substance under l.C. § 37-2732(c).

At a

preliminary hearing, the state is required to present evidence "upon every material
element of the offense charged."

l.C.R. 5.1(b). The state presents its theory of the

charge, both through argument and by the complaint filed, and then the magistrate
examines the charge from the state, along with the evidence presented, to determine
whether "a public offense has been committed and [if] there is probable or sufficient
cause to believe that the defendant committed such offense.
McLellan, _

l.C.R. 5.1(b); State v.

Idaho_, 2013 Opinion No. 5, Docket No. 39102, p. 4 (Ct. App. 2013).

Further, although the magistrate is entitled to rely on the theory and argument set forth
by the state, there is no requirement that the magistrate search the record and the law
to find alternate theories of the case for the state to proceed under. McLel/an, at p. 4.
"The duty to proffer theories of a case under which the state wishes to proceed rests
solely with the state, as it possesses the power to bring and subsequently seek to
amend and prosecute charges." Id.
The State alleged that Ms. Neal was in possession of a controlled substance,
methadone, because methadone was present in the umbilical cord blood of her
newborn. Ms. Neal admitted that she had not been prescribed methadone, but denied
ever taking methadone. No evidence corroborating Ms. Neal's claim was introduced or
admitted, nor was any evidence contradicting Ms. Neal's claim introduced.
11/17/11 Tr.)

(See

In this case, the State, in both its initial criminal complaint and its

Information, charged Ms. Neal with felony possession of a controlled substance

7

pursuant to l.C. § 37-2732(c). (R., pp.5-6, 25-26.) The relevant portion of this statutory
provision provides that:
It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless the
substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription
or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter.
Idaho Code § 37-2732(c).
constructive.

Possession of a controlled substance may be actual or

State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 706 (Ct. App. 1994).

When the

defendant is not in actual physical possession, the State must show that the defendant
had such knowledge and control of the substance as to establish constructive
possession. Id.

"[C]onstructive possession exists where a nexus between the

accused and the controlled substance is sufficiently proven so as to give rise to the
reasonable inference that the accused was not simply a bystander but, rather, had the
power and the intent to exercise dominion or control over the [drugs]." State v. Garza,
112 Idaho 778, 784 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that although proximity alone will not prove
possession, defendant's nonexclusive control over premises where evidence was
found, combined with his knowledge of the marijuana, and his written records of
frequent business transactions with persons engaged in drug dealings, showed both
power and intent to exercise control over the marijuana).
The "possession" language of l.C. § 37-2732(c), when applied to whether a
person can "possess" a controlled substance when the substance is only found in the
individual's blood has not previously been interpreted by any Idaho appellate court and
is therefore an issue of first impression. Construction and application of statutes are
purely legal questions, and therefore reviewing courts exercise free review. McGee v.
JD. Lumber, 135 Idaho 328, 332 (2000); Mitchell v. Binghal?), 130 Idaho 420
(1997). "The language of the statute has to be given its plain, obvious, and rational

8

meaning." State v. Burnight, 1

Idaho 654, 659 (1999). "\Nhere the language of a

statute is plain and unambiguous, th[e] court must give effect to the statute as written,
without engaging in statutory construction." State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646
(Ct. App. 2001 ).
Ms. Neal does not contest that methadone was found in the umbilical cord blood
of her baby.

Ms. Neal also does not dispute that she did not have a prescription for

methadone. What Ms. Neal does challenge is that the district court's conclusion that
because methadone was present in the umbilical cord blood of B.N., she "possessed"
methadone in violation of l.C. § 37-2732(c).

1.

The Plain Language Of l.C. § 37-2732(c) Is Not Ambiguous

The State failed to show that Ms. Neal "possessed" the methadone in B.N.'s cord
blood.

Although Idaho Code § 37-2732(c) does not require any mental state as an

element of the crime; the Idaho Supreme Court has held that "the offense requires a
general intent that is, the knowledge that one is in possession of the substance"
whether it be marijuana, cocaine, or another controlled substance. State v. Fox, 124
Idaho 924, 926 (1993).

However, the individual need not know the substance

possessed is a controlled substance. Id. In determining whether intent was an element
of the crime of possession of a controlled substance, the Idaho Supreme Court in Fox
stated: "whether a criminal intent is a necessary element of a statutory offense is a
matter of construction, to be determined from the language of the statute in view of its
manifest purpose and design .... " Id. at 925 (quoting State v. Sterrett, 35 Idaho 580,

9

583 (1922)).

The Court went on to conclude that "knowledge that one is in possession

of the substance" is an essential element of the offense.

6

Fox, 1

Idaho at 926.

In this case, actual possession is not an issue, as both the Complaint and the
Information charged her specifically with constructive possession of the methadone.
(R., pp.5-6, 25-26.) Thus, the State must show that Ms. Neal had both knowledge and

control of the substance in order to establish constructive possession. See Gomez, 126
Idaho at 706.

a.

The State Has Offered No Evidence Of Knowledge

The State failed to show that Ms. Neal had knowledge of the presence of the
methadone in B.N.'s cord blood. Under Idaho law, it is clear that a defendant must have
knowledge of his possession of a controlled substance.

See l.C. § 37-2732(c); State v.

Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926 (1993).
To satisfy the requirement to establish the material elements under l.C. § 372732(c), the State must have shown Ms. Neal's knowledge that she was in possession
of the substance.

See Fox, 124 Idaho at 926.

However, while Ms. Neal admitted to

Detective McGilvery that she had been prescribed and was taking the prescription
painkiller Norco, which contained the drug Hydrocodone, she denied that she had taken
any methadone.

(11/17/11 Tr., p.7, Ls.1-12.)

Although the question of whether the

defendant knew of the presence of a drug in a vehicle may be corroborated by the

6

In 2005, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained the rationale behind the intent element:
The purpose of the intent element in the definition of a possession offense
is to separate innocent, accidental, or inadvertent conduct from criminal
behavior.

State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 704 (Ct. App. 2005).
10

presence of the same controlled substance in the defendant's body, evidence consisting
solely of a blood test is insufficient to establish knowledge alone.

See State v.

Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635, 638 (Ct. App. 2011).
In this case, the State did not introduce any evidence to corroborate the mere
presence of the substance in the blood in order to establish the knowledge element. 7
The State therefore failed to establish Ms. Neal had knowledge of the presence of
methadone in B.N.'s umbilical cord blood.

b.

The State Has Failed To Offer Evidence That Ms. Neal Exercised
Dominion or Control Over The Controlled Substance

The State failed to show that Ms. Neal had dominion or control over the
methadone in B.N.'s cord blood. Under Idaho law, it is clear that a defendant must have
dominion or control over the controlled substance in order to establish that the
defendant constructively "possessed" the substance.

See Garza, 112 Idaho at 784.

However, once a substance enters a person's body, that person no longer has the
ability to control the substance.

See State v. F/inchpaugh, 659 P.2d at 211; People v.

Spann, Cal.App.3d 400, 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Hornaday, 713 P.2d 71
(Wash. 1986).

Thus, because that language of a statute must be given its plain,

obvious, and rational meaning, "possess" is defined as "[t]o have in one's actual control;

7

Further, as a matter of policy, significant concerns would arise should the State no
longer be required to prove the knowledge element in a possession of controlled
substance case. For example, as a general policy, exceptions would have to be carved
out for specific substances. For example, one such exception should be enacted for the
date rape drug, Rohypnol, which is typically slipped into a victim's drink without his/her
knowledge. Yet, should the term "possess" be interpreted to mean that an individual
may be prosecuted whenever a substance was present in the defendant's blood, a
victim of "roofies" could be guilty of possession of a controlled substance. The
legislature would thus have to craft an exception for those persons who involuntarily had
a controlled substance in their blood.
11

to have possession of."

Black's Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009).

Further, "control" is

given the ordinary meaning of the word, that is, "[t]o exercise power or influence over."
Black's Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009).

Ms. Neal did not have possession or control

over the substance in B.N.'s umbilical cord blood.
In Flinchpaugh, the defendant moved to dismiss after the magistrate found
probable cause at a preliminary hearing.

(R., p.43.)

defendant's motion, and the State appealed.

The trial court granted the

Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d at 209.

The

Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the district court's decision, holding that evidence of
a controlled substance in the defendant's blood did not establish possession of the

substance; nor was it adequate circumstantial evidence to show prior possession by the
defendant, since the drug could have been injected involuntarily or introduced by
artifice.

The Kansas Supreme Court found that once a controlled substance is in a

person's blood, the power of that person to control, 8 possess, use, dispose of, or cause
harm is at an end, and thus evidence of a controlled substance after it has been
introduced into a person's blood does not establish possession of that substance. Id.

659 P.2d at 211.
The Idaho legislature did choose to make illegal simply the presence of a
controlled substance in an individual's blood.

In 1996, the Idaho Legislature

criminalized the "use" of controlled substances under l.C. § 37-2732C:
"[i]t is unlawful for any person ... to use or be under the influence of any
controlled substance specified [herein], except when administered by or
under the direction of a person licensed by the state to dispense,
prescribe, or administer controlled substances.
l.C. § 37-2732C(a).

12

This statute proscribes very different conduct than l.C. § 37-2732(c), depending
entirely on whether the defendant is found to have "possessed" a controlled substance
or merely to have "used" one. Whereas a finding of "possession" is a felony, and upon
conviction, the defendant may be imprisoned for up to seven years or fined up to
$15,000, or both, a finding of "use" is only· a misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum

fine of $1,000 and imprisonment in the county jail for up to six months.
Separate statutes criminalizing possession and use/being under the influence
have also been enacted in numerous other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Spann, Cal.App.3d
at 408; State v. Downes, 572 P.2d at 1330.
Because the legislature has specifically enacted separate legislation to punish
those individuals who have been using or observed as being under the influence of a
controlled substance, this Court should find that "use" should not metamorphose into
"possession." See l.C. § 37-2732C. The legislature enacted a "use" statute to provide
criminal sanctions against an individual using or suspected of being under the influence
of a controlled substance. 9

The legislature, by its separate categorization and

punishment of the offenses, has concluded that these are separate offenses, with
separate elements. To find otherwise would negate the existence of l.C. § 37-2732C
prohibiting "use" of controlled substances.

8

The Supreme Court in Flinchpaugh also examined the ordinary meaning of "control",
finding it meant "to exercise restraining or directing influence over." Id. (internal citations
omitted).
9
Although the criminalization of drug addiction by prosecuting those under the influence
of controlled substances seems inapposite to the Idaho Alcoholism and Intoxication
Treatment Act, l.C. § 39-301. The Idaho Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act
eliminated the status offense of alcoholism, providing that "intoxicated persons will not
be subjected to criminal prosecution or incarceration solely because of their
consumption of alcohol." l.C. § 39-301. State v. Hadley, 122 Idaho 728, 732 (Ct. App.
1992).
13

Moreover, the legislature knew how to craft statutes where a defendant violates
the law by having a specific amount of the substance in his/her blood, for example, the
statue prohibiting driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating
substances states:
(1 )(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol,
drugs or any other intoxicating substances. . . or who as an alcohol
concentration of 0.08, ... or more, as shown by analysis of his blood,
urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
within this state.

l.C. § 18-8004.
The legislature could have easily written l.C. § 37-2732(c) to say "possess, or be
under the influence of a controlled substance" to encompass those with a controlled
substance in their blood.

Under such a set of circumstances, it would have been

apparent the legislature was attempting to make it illegal to have a controlled substance
inside a person's body. Instead, l.C. § 37-2732(c) provides:
It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless the
substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription
or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter.
Idaho Code § 37-2732(c).

The statute is devoid of any reference to blood analysis or

language such as "under the influence," similar to what is set forth in l.C. § 18-8004,
further indicating that the legislature did not intend to include those individuals with
controlled substances in their blood within the scope of the possession statute.
As Idaho appellate courts have not previously addressed this question in light of
the unique set of facts present in this case, we can turn to the case law of other
jurisdictions in our analysis of when dominion or control may establish "possession."
While not controlling, the law regarding "possession" in other states may be
informative.

In People v. Spann, the California Court of Appeals rejected the
14

proposition that possession of a controlled substance may be proven by its use, finding
that after consumption the user no longer has dominion and control over the substance
consumed and hence does not possess it "We agree for the obvious reason that a
person is not in control of a substance that is en route through his digestive
system." People v. Spann, Cal.App.3d 400, 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); see also Evans v.

State, 132 So. 601 (Ala. Ct. App. 1931) (prohibition era case holding that whisky was
not "possessed" when it "is in the man" after consumption); State v. Downes, 52 P.2d
1328, 1330 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) (phencyclidine (PCP) is not possessed by the user after
it has been injected into his arm).
The majority rule in other jurisdictions seems to be that the mere presence of a
controlled substance in an individual's body does not constitute possession within the
meaning of criminal statutes. See State v. Vorm, 570 N.E. 2d 109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that the mere presence of a controlled substance in blood or urine is
circumstantial evidence of prior possession but insufficient to sustain a conviction
without additional corroborating evidence); State v. Lewis, 394 N.W. 2d 212 (Minn.

Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the usual and ordinary meaning of the term possession
does not include substances injected into the body and assimilated into the system);

State v. Hornaday, 713 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1986) ("Once a narcotic is injected into the vein,
or swallowed orally, it is no longer in the individual's control for purposes of
possession."); State v. Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208 (Kan. 1983) (concluding that once a
controlled substance is within a person's system the power of the person to control
possess use dispose of or cause harm is at an end); State v. Thronsen, 809 P.2d 941
(Alaska App. 1991) (holding that defendant could not be convicted of possession of
cocaine "in his body"); In the Matter of R.L.H., 116 P.3d 791 (Mont. 2005) (holding that
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the presence of a controlled substance in a person's blood constitutes sufficient
circumstantial evidence to prove prior possession only when accompanied by other
corroborating evidence of knowing and voluntary possession).
Accordingly, this Court should hold that the district court erred in denying
Ms. Neal's motion to dismiss because "dominion or control" over a controlled substance
cannot be found where the controlled substance is present only in her blood.

c.

The State Failed To Establish "Possession" By Ms. Neal As The
Controlled Substance Was Not Found In Ms. Neal's Blood

The issue in this case is not simply whether probable cause existed to find that
Ms. Neal possessed a controlled substance under l.C. § 37-2732(c) due to the
presence of the substance in her blood, but whether the presence of the substance
located only in her baby's cord blood could be used to establish that Ms. Neal
possessed the substance in violation of the statute.

Because the finding of probable

cause must be based upon "substantial evidence" of "every material element of the
offense charged," the district court erred in denying Ms. Neal's motion to dismiss. See
l.C.R. 5.1(b).
The district court erred in finding that Ms. Neal "possessed" a substance found in
her baby's cord blood.

l.C. § 37-2732(c) does not provide for the prosecution of

mothers who have recently given birth to babies who have traces of a controlled
substance in their blood.
In this case, the only physical evidence against Ms. Neal is a test of her
newborn's umbilical cord blood, which tested positive for methadone.

Ms. Neal

admitted that she did not have a prescription for methadone, but denied ever taking
methadone during her pregnancy.

However, this is insufficient to constitute probable
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cause to believe that Ms. Neal "possessed" controlled substances in violation of
l.C. § 37-2732(c).
The mere presence of a controlled substance in the blood or urine of a newborn

is insufficient evidence to establish probable cause to that the mother possessed a
controlled substance in contravention of l.C. § 37-2732(c). As discussed herein,
possession requires knowledge and the power and intent to exercise dominion or
control over the controlled substance. See Garza, 112 Idaho ;;at 784. As this cannot be
established solely based on the presence of a drug in the body, likewise the State's
arguments regarding possession when the substance is not in the defendant's body, but
instead is found in the defendant's baby's cord blood, fail.
Other jurisdictions that have been faced with the issue of whether a woman may
be charged with possession or distribution of a controlled substance based on residual
drug metabolites in her infant have ruled the evidence to be insufficient.
The Supreme Court of Florida ruled that cocaine metabolites found in an infant's
urine after birth was insufficient evidence to convict the mother of delivery of a
controlled substance. Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992). Similarly, in the
case of Jackson v. State, 833 S.W. 2d 220 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), the Court of Appeals of
Texas determined that the presence of residual drugs in an infant was insufficient
grounds for charging the mother with possession. Id. at 223. In Jackson, the Court of
Appeals declined to hold that a positive test result for drugs in bodily fluids satisfies the
elements of the offense of cocaine possession.

Jackson, 833 S.W. 2d 220. In

Oklahoma, a district court dismissed charges of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance brought against a woman who ingested illegal drugs while pregnant, finding
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that the presence of drugs in the defendant's system does not constitute possession.

v. Alexander, No. CF-92-2047 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Tulsa Cty. Aug. 31, 1992).
Here, the State alleged in its Information that Ms. Neal committed the offense on
April

2011; however, B.N. was eight days old on April 4, 2011.

Because the only

evidence introduced by the State at the preliminary hearing was evidence of the
presence of methadone metabolites in B.N.'s cord blood, the State failed to offer any
evidence of a date or place at which the alleged possession occurred. It appears that
the State charged Ms. Neal with presently possessing methadone; yet on April 4, 2011,

Ms. Neal did not control B.N.'s umbilical cord. No testimony was introduced as to how
the methadone metabolites were introduced into the umbilical cord of B.N. (11/17/11

Tr.) Because the State failed to show that Ms. Neal had the power to exercise dominion
and control over the methadone in B.N.'s umbilical cord blood, or even the date or
location that Ms. Neal allegedly ingested methadone, Ms. Neal cannot be prosecuted
for the contents of her newborn baby's cord blood.

2.

Alternatively, To The Extent There Is An Ambiguity Within The Statute,
Pursuant To The Rule Of Lenity, It Must Be Interpreted In Favor Of
Ms. Neal

If there is an ambiguity within l.C. § 37-2732(c), public policy considerations weigh
heavily against prosecutions of drug addicted mothers. The prosecution of a mother for
illegal use of controlled substances during pregnancy would serve only to dissuade
drug-addicted mothers from seeking treatment or pre-natal medical care.
Idaho Legislature could not have intended such a result.

Clearly the

Thus, rather than face the

possibility of prosecution, pregnant substance abusers may simply avoid prenatal or
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medical care for fear of being detected. 10 Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1295-96. Yet the
newborns of

women are, as a group, the most fragile and sick, and most in need

of hospital neonatal care. Id. at 1296. The California Medical Association has noted:
[T]o bring criminal charges against a pregnant woman for activities which
may be harmful to her fetus is inappropriate. Such prosecution is
counterproductive to the public interest as it may discourage a woman
from seeking prenatal care of dissuade her from providing accurate
information to health care providers out of fear of self-incrimination. This
failure to seek proper care or to withhold vital information concerning her
health could increase the risks to herself and her baby.
Report of the American Medical Association Board of Trustees, Legal Interventions
During Pregnancy, 264 JAMA 2663, 2669 (Nov. 28, 1990). Such considerations led the
American Medical Association Board of Trustees to oppose criminal sanctions for
behavior by a pregnant woman toward her fetus. Id. at 2670. Likewise, the American
Public Health Association recommends that no punitive measures be taken against
pregnant women who are users of illegal drugs when no other illegal acts have been
committed.

See American Public Health Association 1990 Policy Statement.

In

Georgia, the Court of Appeals concluded that their legislation did not intend to
prosecute pregnant women who ingest controlled substances.

State v. Luster, 419

S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that legislature treated addiction in pregnancy as
a disease and indicated a preference for treatment over prosecution).
If this Court finds that l.C. § 37-2732(c) is ambiguous with regard to the
"possession" language, the rule of lenity requires that it be construed in favor of
Ms. Neal. Where the statute is not ambiguous, the appellate court is to give effect to
the plain meanings of the terms in the statute. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr.,

10

Such enforcement would likely encourage women to abort their fetus, rather than face
criminal prosecution for giving birth to a child who tests positive for illegal controlled
substances.
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151 Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011).

However, should the Court find that the statute is

ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires that ambiguity to be resolved in Ms. Neal's favor.

e.g., State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103 (2008). "It is well-settled that criminal
statutes are to be construed strictly and in favor of the defendant." State v. McCoy, 128
Idaho 362, 365 (1996). "[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be
resolved in favor of lenity." United States v. LeCoe, 936 F.2d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1991)
(quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 811 (1971 )).

The United States

Supreme Court spoke to the cannons for interpreting an ambiguous statute in State v.

Crandon, 494 U.

1

(1990). The Court stated:

In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole
and its object and policy. Moreover, because the governing standard is
set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in
resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage. To the
extent that the language or history is uncertain, this "time-honored
interpretive guideline" serves to ensure both that there is fair warning of
the boundaries of criminal conduct and the legislatures, not courts, define
criminal liability.
Id. at 1001-1002. As is acknowledged above, criminal statutes are promulgated on the

premise that they give notice to society regarding the bounds of the law, one of the
quintessential requirements of due process of law. Inherent in the concept of fair
warning and due process, the general public cannot be on notice of what might have
been the legislature's intent or policy behind drafting a statute.
The rule of lenity requires that in the interest of justice and to protect Ms. Neal's
due process rights, this Court should refrain from ascertaining the possible intent of the
legislature or the policies it might have had in mind in enacting the statute. Accordingly
as is articulated herein, in order to show that Ms. Neal "possessed" the methadone
within the meaning of l.C. § 37-2732(c), the State was required to show that Ms. Neal
20

had knowledge of the presence of methadone and that she exercised dominion and
control over the methadone found in the umbilical cord blood of her newborn. Under
this interpretation of the statute, because the State offered insufficient evidence to
convict Ms. Neal of felony possession of a controlled substance, the district court's
order denying her motion to dismiss should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Neal respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's Order
denying Ms. Neal's Motion To Dismiss and vacate her conviction.
DATED this 21st day of February, 201

Public Defender
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